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In 2005, the small, poverty-stricken countries of Central America will embark on a grand experiment in free trade with the rich and powerful "colossus of the north." It is a wager of significant proportions that will reshape their economies and societies in the coming decades, and provide new fodder for the ongoing global debate on the advantages and drawbacks of trade integration among countries with vastly unequal levels of development. The catalyst is the Central American Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, which will bind the economies of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (as well as the Dominican Republic) to that of the United States. Over a period of [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] years, CAFTA will reduce barriers to investment, open state-owned monopolies to foreign competition, eliminate most agricultural tariffs, and deepen economic harmonization within the region. It is a milestone in the effort to unite the 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere into a single Free Trade Area of the Americas. The leaders of Central America, a region plagued by violence, endemic poverty, and economic backwardness, see deeper economic integration with the United States as a crucial step toward securing a better future for their countries.
Since becoming president, George W. Bush has been an important partner in expanding trade opportunities in the Americas, and his support for CAFTA has been steadfast. Indeed, while most of Latin America experienced a wave of anxiety and dismay over his reelection in November, the mood in Central America was optimistic. The Costa Rican government urged the Bush administration to "take advantage of the opportunity to renew its promise of increased commercial integration to the benefit of the people of Central America." 1 Nicaraguan president Enrique Bolaños declared that the outcome "was sure to accelerate ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement."
2 And El Salvador's Antonio Saca announced that Bush's victory was "good news for Central America." 3 Of course, Central America is already closely tied economically to the United States, which is by far the region's largest trading partner and most significant source of foreign investment. In 2002, the United States was the destination for 57 percent of Central America's exports and provided 41 percent of its imports. However, while U.S. exports to the region expanded by a healthy 10 percent in 2003, Central America's exports to the United States grew much more slowly and lagged behind the rest of the world. 4 Exports to the United States from the five Central American countries in 2003 totaled $12.4 billion, with more than half coming from Costa Rica and Honduras, another quarter from Guatemala, one-sixth from El Salvador, and the remaining 5 percent or so from Nicaragua. Apparel products accounted for about 60 percent of this trade. Fruit, coffee, seafood, and mineral commodities made up the balance in most countries, with the exception of Costa Rica, which has leveraged shrewd investments in computer chip technology and integrated circuits to make these industries its principal export generator.
5 Costa Rica claims more than half of Central America's $3 billion in annual foreign direct investment from the United States. The Dominican Republic, a late addition to CAFTA, has a profile similar in size and importance to Costa Rica's but is even more entwined with the U.S. economy.
In May 2004, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick was joined in Washington by representatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua for the signing of the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The Dominican Republic was added in August, and will be formally included pending resolution of a dispute over a sugar tax. The six countries have a combined population of about 45 million people, and generated nearly $32 billion in two-way trade with the United States in 2003. 6 Yet even when counted as a single unit, these countries would rank only as America's thirteenth-largest trade partner and account for less than 2 percent of all U.S. exports. Although CAFTA has been closely watched by U.S. business and labor, the reality is that Central Americans have much more at stake than their northern neighbor. Their goal, after all, is to escape the chronic underdevelopment that has polarized their politics, crippled their economies, and undermined their societies. On the verge of realization, Central America's free trade strategy faces a gauntlet of challenges, including U.S. trade politics, societal turmoil, global competition, and rural poverty, that will shape the region's political and economic destiny in the coming years.
A Political Piñata U.S. trade politics, always combustible, have become especially heated in the debate over the free trade agreement with Central America, and diverse constituencies have mobilized to defend their interests. Although the Bush administration concluded several trade deals during its first term-including bilateral agreements with Chile, Jordan, Morocco, and Singapore-CAFTA represents by far the most significant proposal in terms of market size and the range of U.S. interests involved. Indeed, the hardest-fought trade battle during Bush's first term was over the restoration of trade promotion authority (once known as "fast track" authority) that gives the executive branch a free hand to negotiate trade agreements that cannot be amended by Congress, only presented for an up-or-down vote. President Clinton used "fast track" to finalize negotiations with Canada and Mexico over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993. But it expired the following year and was subsequently blocked by the Republican-controlled Congress (with no shortage of Democratic complicity) for the remainder of Clinton's term. President Bush regained this authority in the summer of 2002. The Senate ultimately passed it by a comfortable 64-34 margin. But the legislation initially only squeaked through the House of Representatives by one vote, and the final version was approved by a vote of 215-212. Opposition was especially entrenched among House Democrats, with only 10 percent voting in favor.
President Bush first announced his support for the Central American free trade pact at the Organization of American States in January 2002, and the restoration of trade promotion authority removed the first political obstacle to negotiating the agreement. Yet others soon emerged. While the U.S. business sector was broadly supportive of the initiative, the American sugar lobby, anxious to protect U.S. producers from competition, entered the fray as a fierce adversary. Although sugar only represents 1 percent of U.S. agricultural revenues, the industry has accounted for 17 percent of agriculture's political donations since 1990.
This effort paid off handsomely. The final agreement strictly limits sugar imports: after 15 years, Central America will only get a market access quota representing 1.7 percent of total U.S. production. Imports exceeding the quota will be penalized by a steep tariff. Moreover, Central American sugar exporters are encouraged under the agreement to seek compensation for giving up even this meager access to the U.S. market. These measures have partially placated the U.S. sugar lobby at the expense of American consumers while hamstringing Central America's ability to capitalize on one of the few agricultural sectors where it is truly competitive. In November, the sugar lobby incited a last-minute brouhaha when the cash-strapped Dominican Republic imposed a 25 percent tax on imported soft drinks containing high-fructose corn syrup in order to protect its own sugar producers and increase state revenues. The Bush administration, incensed, moved to scuttle the country's inclusion in CAFTA. 8 The episode caused the Wall Street Journal's "Americas" columnist to question "whether narrow U.S. agricultural interests like Big Sugar [could] ever be brought to heel," and to declare that "the sugar lobby's ploy to strangle a promising new market for millions of Latins and Americans ought to scandalize Washington." 9 Though less pugnacious than the sugar lobby, the American textile industry also scored important concessions. Rigid "rules of origin" were imposed so that Central American exporters could only avoid tariffs by producing goods with regional components. Central America is principally engaged in the assembly-for-export business, and it benefits from being able to purchase fabrics on the global market. This will be tightly restricted under CAFTA, which sets limits on materials from suppliers in China and Southeast Asia, for example, and compels the purchase of higher-priced U.S. components. In a recent pro-CAFTA report, the CATO Institute in Washington, D.C., sharply criticized these provisions: "The purpose of forcing those demands on the Central Americans is to secure a customer base for U.S. textile products...[but] exporting protectionism through rigid rules of origin may ultimately kill one of the U.S. textile industry's best export markets." 10 While CAFTA raised the hackles of affected U.S. industries, it galvanized U.S. labor. Although environmental groups and human rights organizations have also criticized the agreement, labor unions have been by far the loudest and most effective voice in opposition. In essence, they argue that U.S. companies will relocate their factories to Central America to take advantage of lower labor costs and a weak regulatory environment that condones violations of labor rights, which will result in the loss of goodpaying U.S. jobs. In their view, Central America's poor labor conditions represent an unfair-and unjust-competitive advantage. While the AFL-CIO and other important unions opposed other trade deals passed during Bush's first term-including agreements with Chile, Singapore, and Australia-they have drawn a line in the sand over CAFTA.
During the recent U.S. presidential campaign, President Bush soft-pedaled his support for CAFTA, seeing little political capital in touting support for free trade during an election year marked by a weak economy. His opponent, Sen. John Kerry, called for the agreement to be renegotiated to include stronger labor and environmental safeguards. On the day the agreement was signed, Kerry called it "a disappointing and unnecessary step backwards" and "a race to the bottom."
11 At the same time, three Democratic members of the House Ways and Means Committee-representatives Charles Rangel (D-NY), Sandy Levin (D-MI), and Xavier Becerra (D-CA)-declared that CAFTA was "on a midnight train to nowhere" because "an integrated market... cannot be built upon the suppression of workers." 12 However, the Bush administration has taken the position that free trade is the best way to raise living standards and consolidate democratic progress in the region. "CAFTA," declared Secretary of State Colin Powell, "will open a new era of economic opportunity for all the countries of Central America." The administration's trade czar, Robert Zoellick, touts the agreement as "an extraordinary opportunity to lock in economic reforms and strengthen the rule of law, good governance, and democratic institutions."
13 Congressional advocates of CAFTA-including some Democrats-think that the potential for job creation in Central America should take priority over labor rights and doubt that stronger labor provisions would be sufficient to win union support. Representatives Cal Dooley (D-CA) and Jerry Weller (R-IL) cite labor's opposition to a trade pact with Australia as proof that the real issue is not workers' rights, but free trade itself: "If labor opposes an agreement with a country with a higher minimum wage, twice the percentage of union workers, and arguably higher labor standards [than the United States], why should anyone believe that it would ever support a trade agreement with Central America?" 14 While John Kerry's pledge to "renegotiate" CAFTA sharpened the political debate in the United States, his position got a chilly reception in much of Central America. Several Central American trade ministers openly criticized his stance during the campaign. The agreement, they pointed out, was negotiated "between governments," not "between political parties." Yet it is not only Democrats who have voiced reservations about CAFTA. Some Republican legislators who are generally supportive of free trade have been irritated by the behavior of several of the CAFTA signatories while the negotiations were taking place in 2003. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, suggested that Costa Rica and Guatemala should be excluded from CAFTA; the senator was annoyed because they had joined the "G-20" group of countries-led by Brazil, China, and India-which demanded an immediate end to agricultural subsidies during the failed Cancún trade summit in September 2003. In the media, CNN's Lou Dobbs kept up a drumbeat of criticism of CAFTA in his series, "Exporting America," saying the agreement would contribute to job losses in the United States. Last August, El Salvadoran president Antonio Saca, worried about CAFTA's uncertain prospects, accused its opponents of turning the agreement into "a political piñata." 15 President Bush shrewdly postponed sending the trade pact to Congress until after the November elections, which bolstered Republican control on Capitol Hill to 55-44 in the Senate and 233-202 in the House. The debate over CAFTA in the 109th Congress promises to be divisive and contentious. Most Democrats will unite in opposition, and some Republican legislators will peel away under pressure from the sugar lobby or other corporate patrons. Although the outcome will hinge on fewer than a dozen votes, the agreement will likely be approved. The stakes are high for the administration because CAFTA's rejection would severely undermine the president's trade agenda for his second term.
Societies under Strain
Life for the majority of people in Central America remains difficult and many face serious hardship. Poverty is widespread, and most of the countries in the region have high rates of illiteracy and disease. All are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. Honduras and Nicaragua, both classified by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries," are among the poorest nations in Latin America. In the absence of an elusive export-led economic revival, the outlook for the region remains bleak. Thus the eagerness on the part of Central America's leaders to see the free trade agreement take effect.
Costa Rica is the exception in this grim panorama. It has the longest tradition of democracy and boasts the most developed economy, in part due to sustained foreign direct investment in the production of sophisticated products like computer chips, integrated circuits, and medical equipment, and it has the region's healthiest and most well-educated workforce. For these reasons, among others, Costa Rica has long been reluctant to engage in integration initiatives that threaten to tie its fate too closely to that of its troubled neighbors. Its gross domestic product is six times greater than neighboring Nicaragua's, and unregulated cross-border migration of Nicaraguans looking for work is a continuing problem. Moreover, the Pacheco government is beleaguered by public sector-strikes, accusations of corruption, and general uneasiness on the part of the public about Costa Rica's initial support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq (later revoked by the country's Supreme Court). Yet Costa Ricans are broadly optimistic about the opportunities afforded by CAFTA. In an opinion poll conducted in 2003, more than half of respondents aged 15 to 29 thought that CAFTA would benefit the region, although many of those polled expressed concerns about the impact on the country's agricultural producers. 16 Although the other CAFTA signatories generally share Costa Rica's optimism, all of them are struggling to confront domestic turmoil against the backdrop of grinding poverty. The popularity of Guatemala's president, Oscar Berger, plummeted during his first year in office due to rising crime, unpopular tax reform proposals, and a resurgence in land invasions by poor peasants. El Salvador leads the region in out-migration, and with one in four of its citizens living in the United States it has become disproportionately reliant on exporting its working-age citizens in order to generate dollar revenues in the form of remittances.
A bitter political feud in Nicaragua has left its president with scant political support, and its ambassador to the United States has warned of "an epic battle against corruption" that will determine the country's future. 17 Honduras has become ground zero for the vicious gang-related violence that is undermining public security throughout the region. Meanwhile, in the Dominican Republic, a newly elected president is struggling to reverse the country's course after the dramatic economic collapse of 2003 that devalued the currency, emptied the public treasury, and led to a sharp decrease in overall living conditions. Central America's current misfortunes are coupled with the low wages and generally weak rule of law that has sparked the fiercest opposition to CAFTA in the United States. Although the International Labor Organization has found that the countries' laws generally meet international standards, there is little doubt that enforcement remains problematic and that labor abuses are widespread. In its 2003 investigation of labor rights in El Salvador, Human Rights Watch found that anti-union activities were common and union organizers were at risk. The Ministry of Labor often favored employers over workers and ignored or minimized cases of abuse.
18 Indeed, Human Rights Watch has determined that Central America's labor laws do not meet international standards, falling short in such areas as freedom of association, protection against anti-union discrimination, and ensuring fair treatment of women. 19 Guatemala has the highest rate of child labor in the Western Hemisphere, with one-third of school age children at work on farms or in factories. 20 The apparent execution by three armed men of a U.S.-based union organizer in his native El Salvador in November brought the region's labor record back into focus in the U.S. media, and Teamsters president James P. Hoffa was reported to have said that the organizer was killed because he "intended to meet with labor leaders and truck drivers in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras." 21 Unfortunately, the U.S. debate over labor standards in CAFTA has hardly addressed the problem of how to protect the rights of Central American workers. The agreement currently calls for countries to enforce their own labor laws but does not require them to meet international standards. Democratic legislators say that "good intentions are no substitute for the enforceability of rules." 22 And some critics of CAFTA want the agreement to be revised to include such labor and environmental provisions as are contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement. But the reality is that the NAFTA side accords, which call for monitoring commissions with weak or no mechanisms for enforcement, have achieved little. According to the trade experts Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, "the real purpose of the agreements was to provide political cover for Democratic members of Congress to support NAFTA." 23 CAFTA's supporters say that exhorting member governments to uphold international labor and environmental standards will lead to compliance and curb abuses.
Putting U.S. domestic politics aside, an argument can be made that addressing core labor standards in trade agreements can help spread the benefits of globalization more broadly. 24 And making these labor standards enforceable can promote the political will necessary to institute such reforms in developing countries. Clearly, the Bush administration guaranteed a more partisan outcome in Congress by opting not to employ more forceful provisions with respect to labor rights in Central America. That said, NAFTA-style side agreements would have improved the prospect for worker protections in Central America only marginally. The real question is whether a free trade agreement with the United States will help bolster Central America's institutions while improving the economic prospects for its workers over the long term. There is no question that many Central Americans see CAFTA as a ray of hope in a region still struggling to gain a toehold in the global economy.
Crisis Management
While the Central American Free Trade Agreement will prove a boon to the region in terms of trade and investment, it is also likely to fall short of its supporters' most optimistic predictions. Central American governments ultimately will be judged on how well they handle the two great traderelated shifts that will affect their economies over the next two decades: the rise of China's textile industry and the gradual removal of tariffs on U.S. agricultural products that CAFTA will require.
China's emergence as a world economic power has been felt throughout the Western Hemisphere, and nowhere more so than in the textile and manufacturing sectors of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Although NAFTA initially fueled the creation of manufacturing jobs in Mexico, U.S. companies are increasingly moving from North America to Asia to take advantage of the relatively high-skilled, low-wage labor in China and elsewhere. This trend is likely to accelerate with the change in global trade rules that took effect on January 1. This date marks the deadline for members of the World Trade Organization to drop 40 years of quotas on textile imports. In this "post-quota" world, the WTO estimates that China's market share of U.S. imports will leap from 11 to 18 percent in textiles, and from 16 to 50 percent in clothing. Mexico's market share of U.S. imports will drop from 10 to 3 percent, and the market share for the rest of the Americas will shrink from 16 to 5 percent. 25 The small and vulnerable economies of Central America and the Caribbean, which have become increasingly dependent on assembly-for-export clothing manufacturing, are facing steep losses. Honduras is the third-largest exporter of clothing to the United States, and the textile and clothing sector accounts for three-quarters of the Dominican Republic's 200,000 assembly jobs. 26 The textile industry accounts for onefifth of the region's jobs, and Central America is projected to lose 30 to 50 percent of its textile industry to China in the absence of a U.S. trade deal. 27 Unable to compete on price, these countries will be forced to adapt their strategies to woo niche industries and to capitalize on their proximity to the U.S. market. Thus, Central American governments have made securing guaranteed access to the U.S. market through CAFTA a top priority. If CAFTA enables the region to survive the China boom with a viable manufacturing sector, then its free trade strategy will look increasingly prescient.
By contrast, the prospect of opening Central American markets to U.S. agricultural products sparked great anxiety during the CAFTA negotiations. About 5.5 million small farmers in Central America make their living from traditional agriculture. CAFTA will eliminate import tariffs on many of the staple crops that are their source of livelihood, including beans, corn, and rice. 28 Agricultural leaders in Honduras and Nicaragua said they would need continuing protection to avoid being severely undermined by imports of corn, sugar, and milk from the United States. In the seventh round of trade talks in September 2003, chief U.S. negotiator Regina Vargo accepted the Central American proposal that tariff protection for agricultural sectors be reduced in stages over 15 years. 29 Yet it is unclear whether the region will be prepared for the massive economic dislocation that will almost certainly occur when U.S. agricultural products eventually flood Central American markets.
Mexico offers a cautionary tale in this regard. Since the implementation of NAFTA, U.S. corn exports to Mexico have doubled, reaching 210 million bushels in 2002. 30 But prices have been kept artificially low due to the roughly $10 billion in annual subsidies paid by U.S. taxpayers to domestic corn producers. 31 While this has given Mexican consumers access to low-cost, high-quality corn, it has jeopardized the livelihood of smallscale Mexican corn farmers. Today, a third of the corn consumed in Mexico is imported from the United States, and the price of Mexican corn has dropped more than 70 percent since NAFTA took effect. According to the Mexican government, 400,000 of the country's farmers abandon their land each year, leaving to look for work in the cities, along the border, or in the United States.
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In 2003, Mexico experienced a period of low-intensity civil unrest as hundreds of thousands of small farmers marched on Mexico City to demand the renegotiation of NAFTA's agricultural provisions.
In fact, wealthy nations retain a vast array of agricultural tariffs, export subsidies, and direct farm assistance that amounts to more than $300 billion annually. The International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C., calculates that these tariffs and subsidies cost developing nations $24 billion each year in lost revenues-including $8.3 billion in Latin America and the Caribbean alone. 33 Central American negotiators did manage to secure a reprieve of 15 to 20 years in which to protect their most sensitive products, and the United States will presumably be forced to deal with subsidies during the Doha round of multilateral trade talks. On the other hand, agriculture has become a poverty trap for millions of low-skilled workers in Central America. It is not a rustic lifestyle to be preserved, but a developmental dead end. If Central American governments institute social adjustment programs that can help modernize the region's agriculture and generate jobs in the cities, they may be able to soften the inevitable blow to rural agricultural producers.
A Chance for Central America?
Central America is faced with chronic development problems for which there is no obvious or easy solution. CAFTA at least appears to offer some chance for economic relief. By winning increased access to the U.S. market and further opening their economies to foreign investment, the small countries of Central America are striving to stay afloat on the choppy seas of the global economy. Many Central American leaders also believe that by definitively aligning their countries with the United States, CAFTA represents a significant geopolitical decision that will reap benefits in the future.
The Central American Free Trade Agreement does create important opportunities for the region. Upon enactment, the United States will drop 60 percent of its tariffs on Central American imports, including on those clothing items that drive the region's textile industry.
34 U.S. foreign direct investment in Central America, which today represents only 1.5 percent of the total American investment in Latin America, is sure to grow substantially. 35 Through CAFTA, member countries can begin to attain a greater degree of regional cooperation, which should spur cross-border trade and increase competitiveness. (Unlike Australia, Central America even managed to wrestle a symbolic concession from the tightfisted U.S. sugar sector.) By stimulating the creation of manufacturing jobs, the agreement may help reduce urban poverty. And as a defensive maneuver to keep Central American textiles from being totally eclipsed by Chinese products, CAFTA is essential.
Yet there can be little doubt that the profound disparity in power between the United States and Central America resulted in a trade pact drained of its greatest promise. Under pressure from U.S. business, the Bush administration heavily distorted CAFTA sugar and textile provisions so as to handicap Central America in precisely those sectors where it should have benefited the most. The politically powerful U.S. agricultural interests won concessions at every turn: agricultural subsidies are one sacred cow that Washington would not touch. Although Central America managed to secure a lengthy reprieve from competition from U.S. exports for its most sensitive agricultural products, the region will face a wrenching adjustment in this sector in the not-too-distant future. In a speech as president-elect last spring, El Salvador's leader, Antonio Saca, described Central America as "perhaps the most stable region, politically speaking, in a Latin America embarking on risky populist projects." 36 CAFTA is intended to anchor that stability, but only time will tell if free trade with the United States will bring enough benefits to keep the dogs of populism at bay. Central America's leaders recognize that CAFTA offers their countries a chance to move forward, and they have rightly seized upon it. Advocates of CAFTA in the United States often invoke the notion of Central America's march to freedom to make their case. A skeptic might argue that freedom is just another word for nothing left to lose.
Surely, during those interminable negotiations that took place throughout 2003, some Central American trade ministers must have daydreamed about what a free trade agreement with the United States would look like if the power asymmetry were less severe. A glimmer of another outcome takes shape: Central American sugar and coffee flood into the American market as U.S. agricultural subsidies are eliminated. Multinational drug companies allow wide access to cheap, life-saving generic medicines, transforming the health standards of the poor. The region's factories snap up materials from Asia for quick assembly and export to the United States. Rising trade and investment fuels equitable and fair labor practices without any need for punitive side accords. But then the fantasy fades.
Central America's negotiators did not have the luxury of letting the great be the enemy of the good. The CAFTA negotiations took place in the context of political and economic realities that had to be firmly kept in mind by the region's nascent democracies. Central America's elected leaders have gambled that something is better than nothing, because in the real world, beggars cannot be choosers.
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